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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

S

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

GREG PHILLIP CASIAS, aka GREG
PHIL CASIAS, aka JOHN PAUL
SANCHEZ,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

Case No. 870585-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant's judgments and commitments of three second
degree felonies were filed in the district court on December 10,
1987 (R. 120). Defendant's notice of appeal was filed with the
Summit County District Court on December 14, 1987 (R. 124), and
the notice of appeal was filed with this Court on December 22,
1987 (R. 125). Under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(f)(Supp. 1988),
and under Utah Court of Appeals Rule 4(a), jurisdiction is proper
in this Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I. Were the palm print exhibits properly admitted?
II. Was defendant properly charged with theft of
property over $1,000 and theft of a firearm?
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Determinative constitutional and statutory provisions
are set out fully, as they appear in the text.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information filed on June 23,
1987, with attempted burglary, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-4-101, and Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202(1); two counts of
burglary, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1); and four
counts of theft, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (R.
2,3).

Arraignment was held in the Fifth Circuit Court of Summit

County (R. 8), and preliminary hearing began on August 18, 1987
(R. 15). At the preliminary hearing, defendant waived the
reading of the information (R. 15), and he was bound over on some
of the charges, reflected in the amended information (R. 40-41).
On November 3, 1987, defendant was convicted by a jury of
burglary; theft of a firearm; and theft (R. 110-112).
Defendant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen years
for each of the second degree felony convictions, the sentences
to run concurrently to each other and consecutively to a
different sentence that defendant was serving on a previous
conviction (R. 119).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 14, 1987, Bradley Steven Browning was in his
home located at 360 Matterhorn Drive in Summit Park, Summit
County, Utah (T. 57-58).

At approximately eight o'clock in the

morning, Mr. Browning looked out the sliding door to his backyard
to see a strange man, whom he later identified as Greg Phillip
Casias, standing between ten and fifteen feet from the door,
staring at the door casings (T. 59). No one had permission to be
in Mr. Browning's backyard on that morning (T. 74). Mr. Browning
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found it particularly unusual to see someone there, because his
house was secluded (there were no homes behind it, it was
surrounded by pine trees and hills), and traffic around his home
was minimal during that time of day (T. 61-66).

Mr. Browning

opened his back door, startling defendant, who stepped forward
and stood about three feet away from Mr. Browning (T. 70). When
Mr. Browning asked defendant what he was doing, the defendant
said that he was looking for his boss's home on Evergreen Drive
(T. 71). Evergreen Drive was some two miles away from Mr.
Browning's home, and the entire Summit Park subdivision was
marked by street signs (T. 71). In Mr. Browning's eight years of
living in that home, none of the many people who ceune to his home
for directions to another address came to the back door - they
all knocked on the front door (T. 85, 88). Mr. Browning told
defendant that he was "quite a ways off the beaten trail," and
directed him to Evergreen Drive (T. 71). During the
conversation, defendant shielded his face with his hands (T. 72).
After defendant left, Mr. Browning took his children,
one of whom was sick, to the doctor (T. 73). After returning
from the doctors' offices, Mr. Browning called the sheriff to
report his encounter with defendant (T. 73). He failed to
identify anyone in the first photograph array (defendant's
picture was not included therein (T. 123)), and during the second
photograph array he identified defendant as the man in his
backyard (T. 75). During defendant's trial, Mr. Browning
identified defendant as the man he saw on May 14, 1987 in his
backyard (T. 66). While defendant's jury did not reach a verdict
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on the criminal trespass charge, which was based on the events
that occurred at the Browning residence, the facts which occurred
at the Browning residence are relevant on appeal because they
demonstrate defendant's presence in the vicinity of the crime on
the day of the crime, and his knowledge of the location of the
approximate crime scene.
On May 14, 1987, Mark J. Ingersoll was living with his
daughter in a home on 145 Evergreen Drive, Summit Park (T. 9091).

On that day, he and his daughter locked and left their home

between eight and eight-thirty in the morning (T. 91). They
returned home together at nine in the evening, to find that
someone, without permission, had entered their home from the
north deck window, and had ransacked the closets, and taken
several items (T. 92-96).

Items missing included a video

cassette recorder worth $900 (T. 97), a portable television worth
$250 (T. 97), two diamond rings worth $500 each (T. 97), from $75
to $100 in cash (T. 97), four silver dollars worth a total of $50
(T. 97), and a leather bag worth $35 (T. 98). A 25-caliber
automatic pistol was also taken (T. 98). The doors to the home
and the screen to the north deck window were damaged by the
intruder. (T. 98).
In Mr. Ingersoll's daughter's bedroom, which had been
ransacked, Mr. Ingersoll found a Coor's Light beer can on the
dresser (T. 98). The can was not in that location when the
Ingersolls left their home on the morning of May 14, 1987, and
Mr. Ingersoll testified that he did not leave the can there, and
that he did not allow his daughter to drink alcoholic beverages
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(T. 99). Mr. Ingersoll pointed out the beer can to Larry Henley,
the investigating officer (T. 98-99).
Larry Henley gave the beer can, which he had placed
inside a plastic bag, to Detective Offrett (T. 105), who
transferred it to Scott Pratt, at the Bureau of Criminal
Identification (T. 120). Scott Pratt, of the State Crime
Laboratory, examined the beer can found in Mr. Ingersoll's
daughter's bedroom and removed a print therefrom (T. 150). He
testified that the print from the beer can matched the print from
one of defendant's palm print cards made while defendant was
incarcerated (T. 173-174).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's refusal to obey the court's order to submit
to repeat palm printing, in order to cure this objection prior to
trial, precludes defendant's ability to argue on appeal the
admissibility of the original prints, which were properly
admitted under the rules of evidence.

Defendant overemphasizes

the significance of the palm print exhibits in the prosecution's
case; they were not necessary to the testimony of the palm print
expert.
Theft of a gun and theft of property exceeding $1,000
in value were properly charged as separate crimes because the two
crimes do not share identical elements.

Regardless of the

propriety of the charges, because defendant was sentenced to
serve concurrent sentences on the two crimes, any alleged error
was harmless.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PALM PRINT EXHIBITS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED.
Defendant argues that Exhibit 7, the palm print cards,
were admitted in violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 1002, which
reads:
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or
photograph, the original writing, recording, or
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in
these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court of this State or by Statute.
This Court's standard of review for this issue is the "abuse of
discretion" standard.
636, 637-8 (1972).

State v. Tuggle, 28 Utah 284, 501 P.2d

The two Utah Rules of Evidence which allow

for the trial court's action in admitting Exhibit 7 are rules
1003 and 1004.

Rule 1003 provides that:

A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an
original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to
the authenticity of the original or (2) in the
circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate
in lieu of the original.
Defendant claims that Rule 1003 was inapplicable at trial because
of his numerous challenges to the authenticity of the documents:
The State could not show where the copies came from
(R126; Pg. 134, 1. 15 to pg. 136, 1. 2); the State did
not know or show who made the copies (R126: pg. 134, 1.
15-22); the State did not show who had custody of the
originals and what precautions were taken to avoid
tampering (R126: Pg. 135, 1. 2 to pg. 136, 1. 2); it
was shown that copies did not represent the full
original documents but only portions (R126: pg. 167, 1.
17 to page. 170, 1.15) and,; there was a discrepancy
between the appearance of Defendant's signature on the
two cards (R126: pg. 133, 1. 1-13).
However, the authenticity of the exhibit was well
established by the testimony of the person who took the prints,
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Mr. Carr.

On May 28, 1987, Darrin Carr, the jailer of the Salt

Lake County Jail took palm prints from defendant (T. 130). These
were the only palm prints that Mr. Carr had taken during his
extensive career in fingerprints at the jail (T. 131). The cards
on which the prints were taken bore typed identification of
defendant, and the signature of Mr. Carr (T. 132). Mr. Carr
watched defendant sign both the left and right hand cards, the
latter one in a rather shaky manner because defendant signed that
one after the print was made, and he was holding his hand in an
unnatural manner in order to prevent the print from smearing (T.
133).

Mr. Carr testified that he knew the exhibits of the prints

were duplicates of the prints he had made because he recognized
his signature, and defendant's signatures, which Mr. Carr had
witnessed (T. 136). Further, the exhibits conformed with Mr.
Carr's memory of his use of two different card sides for the two
different hands (T. 166-167).

See James Manufacturing Co. v.

Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 210, 390 P.2d 127, 129 (1964) ("Plaintiff
objected to the introduction of this exhibit upon the grounds
that it was not the best evidence and that production of the
original had not been demanded by defendant.
without merit.

This contention is

The exhibit was authenticated by defendant and

was apparently written in response to a letter sent to him by
plaintiff.

Under such circumstances, the carbon copy was

admissible as a 'duplicate original.'")
Even if the exhibits were not admissible as duplicates
under Utah Rule of Evidence 1003, they were admissible under Rule
1004, which reads:

7-

The original is not required, and other
evidence of the contents of a writing,
recording, or photograph is admissible if:
(1) Originals lost or
destroyed. All originals are lost
or have been destroyed, unless the
proponent lost or destroyed them
in bad faith; or
(2) Original not obtainable.
No original can be obtained by any
available judicial process or
procedure; or
(3) Original in possession of
opponent. At a time when an
original was under the control of
the party against whom offered, he
was put on notice, by the
pleadings or otherwise, that the
content would be a subject of
proof at the hearing, and he does
not produce the original at the
hearing; or
(4) Collateral matters. The
writing, recording, or photograph
is not closely related to a
controlling issue.
Review of the trial testimony establishes that the
original prints qualified for admission under subparagraphs (1)
and (2) of Rule 1004. Mr. Carr testified at trial that the print
exhibits were duplicates of the originals, and that he and the
city employees did not know where the originals were (apparently
there was some speculation on the part of the city employees that
a detective working on the case had the originals)(T. 133).
Officer Offrett testified that he had contacted the city records
department and Sergeant Jensen, who had sent the duplicates to
Officer Offrett, but neither could locate the original print
cards (T. 143). When Mr. Levine, defendant's attorney,
challenged the authenticity of the duplicates, Mr. Carr admitted
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that he left the print cards with his sergeant, that they were
presumably sent to the department thereafter, that he did not
make the copies, and that he did not know where the originals
were (T. 135-136).

See State v. Tugglef 28 Utah 284, 501 P.2d

636, 637-8 (1972)("While the principal custodian of the records
was out of the state and unable to testify, other employees
testified as to the correctness of the copies.

The State moved

for a continuance so that the absent witness might be brought
back to testify.

The court, however, refused to grant a

continuance, apparently convinced that his testimony would not be
necessary.").

The palm print exhibit was admissible under

subparagraphs (1) and (2) of Rule of Evidence 1004.
Further, it is arguable that the palm print exhibit was
admissible under subparagraph (3) of Rule 1004, which is titled
"Original in possession of opponent."

A review of the record

indicates that during the preliminary hearing, the print from the
Coor's Light can and the defendant's matching print were offered
into evidence, but defense counsel objected to the admission,
attacking the authenticity of the matching palm print (R. 20).
The hearing was continued so that Mr. Carr, the officer who took
the prints from defendant, could come and testify for the court
(R. 29). When the State had difficulty producing this witness,
and sought to obtain new prints from defendant, his counsel filed
a motion for a protective order, arguing that if defendant were
forced to give his prints, it would violate his fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination (R. 20-21).

Subsequently, after

the court ordered defendant to submit to additional
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fingerprinting, and defendant refused to do so, the court ordered
the State to obtain an affidavit from the Bureau of Criminal
Investigations (R. 27). At a later continuation of the
Preliminary Hearing, Mr. Carr was able to testify for the State
concerning the printing process, and the authenticity of the
copies of the original prints (R. 31). At that hearing, the
prints were admitted over the objection of defendant that the
print exhibits were duplicates, not originals (R. 32).
In these circumstances, defendant was certainly on
notice that the print exhibits would be "subject of proof" at the
trial.

He had access, not to the originals of the duplicates in

Exhibit 7, but to the original originals - his actual palm
prints.

In fact, he was under court order to produce them prior

to trial, but failed to do so.

Particularly in view of

defendant's refusal to cooperate with the trial court in
producing additional prints, the trial court was acting within
its discretion in admitting the duplicates.

See Meyer v. General

American Corporation, 569 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah 1977) (oral
testimony concerning the contents of unavailable business records
was properly admitted as secondary evidence under old Rule of
Evidence 70 because records were in hands of president of party
company, who refused access to the records).
Defendant makes much of the fact that the palmprint
exhibit was "so crucial to the State and so damaging to the
defendant"

(Appellant's Brief p.7).

He fails to recognize that

the palm print expert most likely could have testified, without
the exhibits, that defendant's palm print, taken while he was
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incarcerated, matched the one on the beer can in the Ingersoll
home.

See State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 268-270 (Utah

1985)(ballistics expert may testify, with sufficient foundation,
about ballistics tests without photographs and other physical
exhibits for comparison).

While testimony on the palm print

match, without comparison exhibits, perhaps would have been less
convincing to the jurors, it is doubtful that the degree of proof
contributed by the exhibits is as great as that attributed to
them by defendant.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED WITH THEFT OF
PROPERTY OVER $1,000 AND THEFT OF A FIREARM,
TWO SEPARATE OFFENSES UNDER UTAH LAW.
Defendant claims that he was improperly convicted of
theft of property over $1,000 and theft of a firearm, noting that
both thefts occurred during the same time and at the same place,
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412, which reads as follows:
(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be punishable
as follows:
(a) As a felony of the second degree if:
(i) The value of the property
or services exceeds $1,000, or
(ii) The property stolen is a
firearm or an operable motor
vehicle; or

(b) As a felony of the third degree if:
(i) The value of the property
or services is more than $250
but not more than $1,000,
•

• • •

(ii) When the property taken is
a stallion, mare, colt,
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gelding, cow, heifer, steer,
ox, bull, calf,, sheep, goat,
mule, jack, jenny, swine, or
poultry.

The statute which controls defendant's duplicitous
charge argument is Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402, which provides, in
part, as follows:
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall
establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of
this code, the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other
such provision.
The general rule for determining whether charged
offenses are duplicitous is stated in State v. Hobson, 234 Kan.
133, 671 P.2d 1365 (1983), "whether each of the offenses charged
requires proof of an additional element of the crime which the
other does not and if an additional fact is required, the
offenses are not duplicitous."

JId. at 1372. That court further

explains that "duplicity does not depend upon whether the facts
proved at trial are actually used to support conviction of both
offenses, rather, it turns upon whether the necessary elements of
proof of the one crime are included in the other."
Utah law appears to accord with these principles.

IdL at 1374.
See State v.

Smathere, 602 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1979)("Defendant's second point
is that the conduct prohibited . . . for rape . . • is the same
conduct prohibited • . . for aggravated sexual assault. • • .
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reading of the statutes referred to, it is amply clear that the
elements of the two crimes are not the same.")
Reviewing the theft statute set out above demonstrates
that theft of a gun and theft of $1,000 differ in the element
describing the object of the theft.
necessarily included in the other.

And neither crime is
Defendant here stole a gun

and property exceeding $1,000 in value, and was properly charged
with both offenses as they were defined by the Utah legislature.
Such legislative distinctions between crimes have previously been
approved of by the courts.

See e.g., State v. Clark, 632 P.2d

841, 841-845 (Utah 1981)(defendant, charged with theft of
livestock for taking three turkeys, failed in challenging theft
statute's classification of theft of livestock as a third degree
felony without regard to value of livestock taken, because
legislature's distinctive recognition of livestock was rational).
Numerous cases factually parallel the instant one, and
demonstrate that this defendant was properly charged with,
convicted of, and sentenced for all of the crimes which occurred
during the criminal episode of May 14, 1987.

See State v.

Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah App. 1987) (placing mouth on
the victim's breasts and touching her vagina were separate
chargeable offenses in one criminal episode); State v. O'Brien,
721 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1986)(defendants were properly
convicted and sentenced separately for each crime of aggravated
burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and theft of
firearms, although each of these separate acts occurred during
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one criminal episode); State v, Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah
1985)(defendant was properly convicted of two separate counts of
burglary for burglarizing an apartment and the apartment's
laundry facilities, which were separately secured because
"[ajlthough defendant's crimes were committed during a single
criminal episode, he committed two distinct burglaries separately
punishable under section 76-1-402.").

See also State v. Bradley,

752 P.2d 874, 878 (Utah 1985) ("'where the two crimes are such
that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having
committed the lesser, then as a matter of law they stand in the
relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant
cannot be convicted or punished for both.'").
Because defendant's sentences on all three second
degree felony convictions were ordered to run concurrently, even
if it were error to have convicted defendant of both theft of
property over $1,000 and theft of a firearm, it would be harmless
error.

People v. Morgan, 539 P.2d 130, 131 (Colo. 1975)

(convicting defendant of two counts of conspiracy based factually
on one criminal episode was error, but harmless error because
sentence for conspiracy ran concurrently with those for
legitimate convictions).

See also State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 98

(Utah 1983) ("When a defendant has been improperly convicted of
both a greater and a lesser offense, it is appropriate to regard
the conviction on the lesser offense as mere surplusage, which
does not invalidate the conviction and sentence on the greater
offense.").
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CONCLUSION
The trial court acted within its discretion in
admitting Exhibit 7, the duplicates of the palm prints of
defendant.

The authenticity of the duplicates was established at

trial, the original was lost, and defendant had control over the
best evidence of his palm prints, and refused to cooperate in
providing the same for the trial court.
Defendant was properly charged with theft of property
over $lf000 and theft of a firearm.

While both crimes occurred

during the same criminal episode, and while the same facts from
that episode are used in establishing some of the elements for
both of the crimes, the element dealing with the object of the
theft differs between the two crimes.

Several rational bases

exist to explain the distinction drawn by the legislature (i.e.
the right to bear arms is constitutionally protected; burglars
should not have guns), and the trial court acted properly in
allowing defendant to be convicted of both crimes defined by the
legislature.
If the two crimes were charged in a duplicitous fashion
in this case, the trial court's concurrent sentencing removed the
prejudice that might have been caused in that event.
Defendant'8 convictions should be affirmed.
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